前沿 | Journal of Comparative Politics（比较政治学杂志）No.2–2020
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政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《比较政治学杂志》2020年第2期文章编译。
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PART
一
期刊简介
Journal of Comparative Politics（比较政治学杂志）是由纽约城市大学负责的比较政治学领域顶级期刊，始于1968年，分别在每年1月、4月、7月、10月出版。期刊主要呈现针对政治制度和政治过程比较研究的学术文章，并借此平台与社会科学家、学者、学生、公众和NGO官员交流新的想法和研究发现。
PART
二
期刊目录
Legacy Trade Unions as Brokers of Democratization? Lessons from Tunisia
拥有前威权统治遗产的工会成了民主化的中介？来自突尼斯的经验
Selling Austerity: Preferences for Fiscal Adjustment during the Eurozone Crisis
贩卖紧缩政策：欧元区危机期间对财政调整的偏好
Dynamics of the Inner Elite in Dictatorships: Evidence from North Korea
独裁统治下内部精英的动态：来自朝鲜的证据
Host State Engagement, Socioeconomic Class, and Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Germany
东道国的介入，社会经济阶层与土耳其和德国的叙利亚难民
Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China
回应性还是压迫性？中国的一线官僚如何强制施行计划生育政策
The Politics of Succession in Charismatic Movements: Routinization versus Revival in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru
卡里斯马运动中的继承人政治：阿根廷、委内瑞拉和秘鲁的制度化与运动复兴
Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India
在职、党派和议会：来自印度的理论和证据
PART
三
精选译文
01 拥有前威权统治遗产的工会成了民主化的中介？来自突尼斯的经验
【题目】
More Effective Than We Thought: Accounting for Legislative Hitchhikers Reveals a More Inclusive and Productive Lawmaking Process
【作者】
Bishara, Dina
【摘要】
突尼斯总工会（UGTT）成为该国从威权主义转型过程中的主要行动者。现有的解释集中于威权主义的遗产、工会独立于国家的自治程度以及劳工支持民主化的物质激励，并不能充分说明工会在突尼斯转型过程中所发挥的政治作用的高调特征。相反，正如本文所论述的那样，前威权统治所遗留给工会的遗产是理解工会在威权统治过渡过程中所扮演角色的关键。如果工会在政权组建阶段拥有政治斗争的历史和强大的组织能力，他们更有可能形成一定程度的内部自治，这使得威权统治者难以剥夺他们的权力。本文采用了历史制度主义的方法，并参考了对突尼斯的实地调查和对劳工活动家的采访。
The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) emerged as a major player in the country’s transition from authoritarianism. Existing explanations – focusing on authoritarian legacies, the degree of trade union autonomy from the state, and labor’s material incentives to support democratization – do not sufficiently account for the high-profile nature of the union’s political role in Tunisia's transition. Instead, as this article argues, the importance of unions’ pre-authoritarian legacy is key to understanding the role of unions in the transition from authoritarian rule. If unions enter the regime formation stage with a history of political struggle and with strong organizational capacities, they are more likely to develop a degree of internal autonomy that makes it difficult for authoritarian incumbents to disempower them. The article employs a historical institutional approach and draws on fieldwork and interviews with labor activists in Tunisia.
02 贩卖紧缩政策：欧元区危机期间对财政调整的偏好
【题目】
Selling Austerity: Preferences for Fiscal Adjustment during the Eurozone Crisis
【作者】
Fernandez-Albertos, Jose
Kuo, Alexander
【摘要】
如何解释欧元区危机期间个人对紧缩政策的偏好？紧缩政策的具体内容或与欧盟相关的因素会在何种程度上影响此种偏好？为了回答这些问题，我们基于对受危机重创的国家西班牙的调查，提供了新的数据和嵌入式实验，来检验有关偏好紧缩政策的理论。我们发现，按传统的方式测算，紧缩政策几乎不受欢迎，但如果突显特定的原因或利益，对紧缩政策的支持会增加。欧盟的认可并不影响公众对紧缩政策的支持，但是当税收增加且关于对欧盟的财政承诺的忧虑变得显著时，对财政支出的支持就会减弱。研究结果有助于理解诸如紧缩之类不受欢迎的政策如何可能得到大部分公众的接受。
What explains individual preferences for austerity during the eurozone crisis? To what extent are such preferences affected by the specific content of austerity policies or EU-related factors? To address these questions, we present new data and embedded experiments that test theories of austerity preferences, from a survey of a crisis-hit country, Spain. We find little support for austerity as conventionally measured, but such support can increase if specific reasons or benefits are made salient. The endorsement by the EU has no effect on austerity support, but support for spending wanes when tax increases and concerns about fiscal commitments to the EU are made salient. The results help understand how unpopular policies such as austerity might be sometimes palatable to large segments of the general public.
03 独裁统治下内部精英的动态：来自朝鲜的证据
【题目】
Dynamics of the Inner Elite in Dictatorships: Evidence from North Korea
【作者】
Mahdavi, Paasha
Ishiyama, John
【摘要】
独裁制度下内部精英的小圈子如何随时间的推移而发生变化？我们借鉴威权制下权力共享的理论，以阐明朝鲜政治的变迁。鉴于在这种情境下收集个人层面的数据较为困难，我们采用网络爬虫技术，捕获官方媒体报道中独裁者的巡视访问活动，以收集有关精英在公共场合共同出现的网络数据。我们测试了这一自2011年12月金正恩上台以来形成的精英网络的持久性，以发现能够揭示精英肃清现象的证据。我们的发现为有关威权制下精英动态的更广泛的文献和有关共产主义国家权力共享的次国家研究做出了贡献。重要的是，我们的方法有助于将对朝鲜政治的研究更坚实地融入政治学研究的主流。
How does the circle of inner elites evolve over time in dictatorships? We draw on theories of authoritarian power-sharing to shed light on the evolution of politics in North Korea. Given challenges in collecting individual-level data in this context, we employ web-scraping techniques that capture inspection visits by the dictator as reported by state-run media to assemble network data on elite public co-occurrences. We test the durability of this network since Kim Jong-un’s rise to power in December 2011 to find suggestive evidence of elite purging. Our findings contribute to the broader literature on authoritarian elite dynamics and to subnational studies on power-sharing in communist states. Importantly, our approach helps bring the study of North Korean politics more firmly in the mainstream of political science inquiry.
04 回应性还是压迫性？中国的一线官僚如何强制施行计划生育政策
【题目】
Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China
【作者】
Mattingly, Daniel C.
【摘要】
威权国家如何实施那些限制个人自由的政策呢？在本文中，我考察了中国计划生育政策的实施。这个政策对中国社会产生了巨大的影响，却至今没有受到政治学家足够的关注。我主张，政策的成功取决于让一线的官僚深入社会。重要的理论指出，官僚深入社会可能会增强官僚对公民的回应性而削弱法律的执行效果。借助一个特殊的数据库和自然实验，我证明了在中国事实正好相反：官僚深入社会的程度每增加一个标准差，超额生育的数量就会减少2%到7%。这表明，官僚利用他们嵌入社会的程度来控制社会。本文揭示了除警察、军队或执政党之外，一线官僚是如何成为压迫和政治控制的关键代理人的。
How do authoritarian states implement policies that curb individual freedom? In this article, I examine the implementation of the One Child Policy in China, which has had an enormous impact on Chinese society and yet has received little attention from political scientists. I argue that the success or failure of the policy hinged on using frontline bureaucrats to infiltrate society. Important theories suggest that bureaucratic penetration may increase bureaucrats’ responsiveness to citizens and decrease implementation of the law. Drawing on a unique dataset and natural experiment, I show the opposite to be true in China: a one standard deviation increase in bureaucratic penetration lowers over-quota births by 2 to 7 percentage points. There is suggestive evidence that bureaucrats leverage their social embeddedness to control society. The article shows how frontline bureaucrats beyond the police, military, or ruling party are key agents of repression and political control.
05 卡里斯马运动中的继承人政治：阿根廷、委内瑞拉和秘鲁的制度化与运动复兴
【题目】
The Politics of Succession in Charismatic Movements: Routinization versus Revival in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru
【作者】
Andrews-Lee, Caitlin
【摘要】
学者们指出，卡里斯马运动必须制度化，才能在奠基人死亡后延续下去。但是，世界各地那些保持了个人化特征的卡里斯马运动仍然存在或实现了复兴。本文研究了政治家在哪些情况下能够利用他们前任的卡里斯马遗产来复兴这些运动并巩固权力。我认为有三个条件——选择领导人的模式、危机的存在以及与奠基人的个人特征保持一致的能力——塑造了继任者继承前任衣钵和并将运动恢复到政治主导地位的能力。为了证明我的理论，我追溯的三场卡里斯马运动——阿根廷的庇隆主义（Peronism）、委内瑞拉的查韦斯主义（Chavismo）和秘鲁的藤森主义（Fujimorismo）——中，一些领导人成功囊括前任的遗产而另一些领导者失败的过程。
Scholars suggest that charismatic movements must institutionalize to survive beyond the death of the founder. Yet charismatic movements around the world that have maintained their personalistic nature have persisted or reemerged. This article investigates the conditions under which politicians can use their predecessors’ charismatic legacies to revive these movements and consolidate power. I argue that three conditions – the mode of leadership selection, the presence of a crisis, and the ability to conform to the founder's personalistic nature – shape successors’ capacity to pick up their forefather’s mantle and restore the movement to political predominance. To demonstrate my theory, I trace the process through which some leaders succeeded while others failed to embody the founder’s legacy across three charismatic movements: Argentine Peronism, Venezuelan Chavismo, and Peruvian Fujimorismo.
06 在职、党派和议会：来自印度的理论和证据
【题目】
Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India
【作者】
Lee, Alexander
【摘要】
人们常常认为，在一些发展中国家，现任议员相对于他们的挑战者而言在选举上面临劣势。本文将此归因于这些国家政党和政府内部的高度集权。在由政党领袖主导的政治体系中，议员影响政策、扶持职位和控制赞助的能力都受到了大量正式和非正式的制约，从而削弱了他们积聚个人选票的能力。我通过涵盖印度1997年以来国家选举的数据库检验了这一理论，并使用了断点回归方法测量在任（这一因素）的影响。那些来自集权化程度较低和不受关于自由议会选举的限制影响的政党、从而受集权因素影响较少的候选人，所面临的在职劣势水平很低，甚至不存在。
Incumbent legislators in some developing countries are often thought to face an electoral disadvantage relative to challengers. This article traces this effect to high levels of centralization within the political parties and governments of these countries. In political systems dominated by party leaders, legislators face substantial formal and informal constraints on their ability to influence policy, stake positions, and control patronage, which in turn reduce their ability to build up personal votes. This theory is tested on a dataset of Indian national elections since 1977, using a regression discontinuity design to measure the effects of incumbency. Candidates less affected by centralization-those from less-centralized political parties and from parties not affected by restrictions on free parliamentary voting – have a low or non-existent incumbency disadvantage.
编 译：吴佳蔚，袁丁
校 对：吴佳蔚，袁丁
相关阅读：
编辑：欧阳星
一审：袁 丁
二审：袁 丁
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